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Abstract: After having discussed the weaknesses of the universalist and territorialist 
approaches to transnational corporate bankruptcy law, this paper argues that a free-
choice  regime  could  combine  the  advantage  of  ex  post  value  maximisation  of  the 
firm’s assets with a comparatively higher degree of ex ante predictability to investors. 
In  addition,  it  could  lead  to  a  better  alignment  between  corporate  ownership 
structures and corporate bankruptcy regimes. Moreover, a free-choice regime could 
potentially  open  the  door  for regulatory  competition  in  corporate  bankruptcy  law. 
However, the EC Regulation 1346/00 on insolvency proceedings implements a system 
of modified universalism, which allows for strategic ex post forum shopping by debtors 
while keeping the national legislatures’ monopoly in the field of corporate bankruptcy 
in place. It is suggested that even though it cannot be predicted that a free-choice 
regime will pressure state lawmakers to improve their corporate bankruptcy laws, a 
system of free choice could redirect the lawmaking agenda in the EU by focusing the 
coordination  efforts  of  lawmakers  on  those  issues  -  such  as  security  interests  in 
property  and  statutory  priority  rights  -  that  could  negatively  affect  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  internal  market,  while  enabling  Members  States  to  customise 
corporate bankruptcy laws to local preferences and needs. 
 
 
I  Introduction 
 
The principles of universalism and territorialism play a starring role in the legal debate 
on transnational business failure. Universalism claims its superiority over territorialism 
in that it would offer investors an enhanced ex ante predictability of the outcomes of 
their  debtors’  bankruptcies  as  well  as  foster  ex  post  value  maximisation  of 
transnational  businesses.  Yet,  despite  the  claimed  advantages  of  universalism, 
territorialism still is the dominant approach to cross-border insolvency, not in the least 
because  states  resist  universalist  regimes  by  pointing  to  the  differences  in  local 
redistributive  policies.  Consequently,  efforts  aiming  at  the  adoption  of  universalist 
regimes have largely failed. 
Because of the little success of many international initiatives so far, the adoption of 
the Council Regulation 2000/1346/EC on insolvency proceedings (EC Regulation or 
Regulation) by fourteen EU Member States is generally perceived as a landmark in the 
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world of cross-border business failure.
1 The EC Regulation provides a set of uniform 
conflict of laws rules that are binding and directly applicable in the Member States, 
thereby  overriding  the  fourteen  Member  States’  national  conflict  of  laws  rules.
2  It 
forwards a universalist approach by vesting the jurisdiction to open universal main 
proceedings with the courts of the Member State where the debtor has its ‘centre of 
main  interests.’  Moreover,  it  offers  a  uniform  framework  for  the  immediate 
recognition  of  judgments  that  are  delivered  directly  on  the  basis  of  insolvency 
proceedings or are closely connected with such proceedings.
3 However, also the EC 
Regulation is prone to the divergence of the Member States’ laws on such substantive 
issues  as  security  interests  in  property,  statutory  priority  rights  of  creditors,  the 
treatment  of  employment  contracts  in  bankruptcy,  and  the  difference  in  actions  to 
avoid fraudulent or preferential transfers of assets. This has led to the inclusion of 
important territorial carve-outs as well as the possibility to open secondary territorial 
proceedings. 
Due to its use of an imprecise home-country standard, the question arises whether 
the EC Regulation enhances the predictability of outcomes to investors. Furthermore, 
the  fact  that  the  EC  Regulation  fails  to  address  the  more  difficult  issue  of  the 
divergence of the Member States’ laws in such areas as security interests in property 
and statutory priority rights raises the issue of whether the choice of law approach 
forwarded  by the EC  Regulation  facilitates the development  toward  more  efficient 
bankruptcy regimes within the European Union. This paper assesses these issues by 
first  recounting,  in  Part  II,  the  main  arguments  exchanged  in  the  debate  on 
universalism and territorialism as the two main competing principles of transnational 
bankruptcy  law.  This  debate  demonstrates  that,  although  universalism  may  have 
advantages with respect to the ex post value maximisation of cross-border businesses, 
proponents of universalism have not been able to argue convincingly that universalism 
would  offer  a  higher  degree  of  ex  ante  predictability  to  investors.  Proponents  of 
territorialism, on the other hand, have not been able to demonstrate that local creditors 
and  local  policies  would  be  systematically  harmed  if  a  universalist  approach  were 
adopted. Part III then turns to the discussion of a more novel approach to transnational 
business  failure,  which  advances  the  principle  of  freedom  of  choice  in  corporate 
bankruptcy as a rival principle of transnational corporate bankruptcy law. Free choice 
in bankruptcy combines the advantages of universalism with respect to ex post value 
maximisation  with  a  comparatively  higher  degree  of  ex  ante  predictability  thereby 
potentially decreasing the costs of capital for firms. In addition, by offering firms the 
possibility to choose ex ante a bankruptcy regime that fits their governance needs and 
preferences, free choice addresses an issue that neither universalism nor territorialism 
take into account, namely that of the complementarities between corporate ownership 
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structure  and  bankruptcy  regimes. Subsequently,  Part  IV  briefly  touches  upon  two 
main barriers to the implementation of both universalism and free choice. First, states 
will  resist  universalist  regimes  if  influential  local  interest  groups  expect  to  be 
jeopardised  by  such  regimes.  Second,  the  failure  to  address  the  problem  of  the 
divergence of substantial laws outside of bankruptcy – importantly the validity and 
recognition of security interests – potentially stifles any attempt to reach a universalist 
or free-choice regime in international bankruptcy. Next, Part V demonstrates how the 
weakened form of universalism embraced by the EC Regulation neither solves the 
problem of ex ante predictability due to the use of an indeterminate home-country 
standard nor paves the way for the development of efficient bankruptcy regimes within 
the EU. In contrast, introducing free choice might pressure state lawmakers to improve 
their  own  corporate  bankruptcy  regimes.  Finally,  the  paper  concludes  that  if  the 
European Union is to consider the potential advantages of regulatory competition for 
the development of more efficient corporate bankruptcy laws, it needs to focus in the 
first place on the convergence of substantial laws outside of bankruptcy such as the 
development of a uniform system for the recognition of security interests and priority 
rights of creditors, and the finding of solutions to cross-border tax issues. 
 
II  Universalism versus Territorialism 
 
Universalism has received much acclaim among bankruptcy scholars.
4 According to 
the  principle  of  universalism,  one  single  forum  controls  the  administration  and 
distribution of a transnational company’s assets, wherever located. All the debtor’s 
creditors  have  the  right  to  file  claims  with  and  share  in  distributions  from  the 
bankruptcy estate. The appropriate forum for starting a universal proceeding is often 
specified as the court of the company’s home country. In general, the home-country 
standard refers to the company’s principal place of business as the connecting factor 
for the vesting of jurisdiction. Where the principal place of business is located may be 
determined by the company’s country of incorporation, the location of its corporate 
headquarters, the location of its principal assets, or its principal business activities. 
Because universalism would not make much sense without a choice of law, the theory 
of universalism implicitly assumes that the choice of forum also includes the choice of 
the  home  country’s  laws  as  the  rules  governing  the  debtor’s  bankruptcy.
5  For 
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universalism to work states should agree on the mutual recognition and enforcement of 
the home country’s insolvency proceedings.
6 
Although universalists do not concur on the exact scope of the home-country law, 
they generally agree that the home country’s bankruptcy laws apply to such issues as 
the conduct of the administration over the assets, the priority ranking among creditors, 
the stay of creditors’ enforcement rights, the question whether and on what terms the 
firm  should  be  liquidated  or  reorganised,  and  the  avoidance  of  pre-bankruptcy 
preferential or fraudulent transfers of assets.
7 However, they disagree as to whether the 
home-country law should govern every aspect of the debtor’s affairs including issues 
that are essentially regulated outside of bankruptcy law.
8 It is, however, important to 
bear in mind that most universalists do not defend a system in which one single law 
decides on all substantive law issues related to a firm’s failure.
9 
Notwithstanding  the  widespread  academic  support  for  universalism,  territorialism 
still persists as the dominant approach to transnational corporate bankruptcy. Although 
until now few academics have defended territorialism, it has recently gained  more 
academic support, not in the least because the divergence of substantial laws among 
countries  impedes  the  establishment  of  a  true  universalist  system.
10  In  a  territorial 
system,  the  power  of  bankruptcy  courts  to  administer  the  assets  of  the  bankrupt 
company is restricted to the assets located within the territories of their jurisdictions. 
However, the persistence of territorialism in the real world does not follow from the 
approach chosen by most national bankruptcy laws. In general, national bankruptcy 
regimes  adhere  to  the  principle  that  the  bankrupt  estate  should  encompass  all  the 
debtor’s assets wherever located. Unilateral universalism thus is the main standard. 
However, because countries generally do not recognise the universal reach of foreign 
bankruptcy  proceedings,  territorialism  is  the  dominant  approach  to  transnational 
corporate bankruptcy as each country’s universalist ambitions are halted at its own 
borders.  
The protection of local creditors and local policies is the most common justification 
for  denying  the  effects  of  foreign  bankruptcy  proceedings.  Such  ‘public  policy’ 
arguments are not only used by jurisdictions that essentially deny any effect of foreign 
insolvency proceedings, but, also, for instance by the modified universalist regime of 
Section 304 of the US Bankruptcy Code,
11 which allows a qualified representative of a 
foreign bankruptcy estate to seek assistance by filing an ancillary proceeding in the 
United  States.
12  Pursuant  to  Section  304,  the  US  bankruptcy  court  can  enjoin  the 
commencement or continuation of any action against the debtor’s property, order the 
turnover of property or the proceeds thereof to the foreign representative, or order 
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other  appropriate  relief.
13  However,  in  order  to  benefit  from  this  promise  of 
universalism, the laws of the foreign forum have to stand a substantive test by the US 
bankruptcy court.
14 What this boils down to is that the US bankruptcy court can deny 
relief to a foreign representative if it finds that US claimholders are not adequately 
protected under the foreign proceeding or the priority of distribution deviates from the 
priority under the US Bankruptcy Code.
15 
 
In general, three main issues figure in the debate on universalism and territorialism. 
First, the issue of ex ante predictability to creditors of the bankruptcy laws applicable 
to their debtor’s failure. Second, the issue of protection of local creditors and policies. 
Third, the issue of value maximisation of insolvent transnational companies. In the 
following three sections, each of these issues will be reviewed. 
 
A  Ex Ante Predictability 
 
Advocates of universalism argue that its most important ex ante advantage would be 
the higher ex ante predictability to creditors, leading to a reduction in informational 
costs and a more accurate pricing of credit.
16 Territorialism would adversely affect ex 
ante predictability by not guaranteeing foreign lenders exactly the same legal position 
as they have  under their home-country laws. In order  for lenders to price the risk 
associated with such legal uncertainty, they need to inform themselves ex ante on the 
bankruptcy  laws  of  each  country  in  which  the  debtor  has  assets.  Informational, 
contracting, and enforcement costs will thus be high and passed on to the debtors in 
the form of increased costs of borrowing.
17 
Yet,  the  fact  that  territorialism  negatively  affects  ex  ante  predictability  does  not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that universalism would increase predictability. In 
order for universalism to do so, it needs to provide lenders ex ante with an unequivocal 
answer  to  the  question  what  bankruptcy  proceedings  and  laws  will  govern  their 
debtors’ insolvencies. However, by simultaneously using different connecting factors 
the home-country standard is likely to refer to more than one jurisdiction in which a 
universal proceeding can be initiated. In addition, the ample discretion for judicial 
interpretation  adds  to  the  vagueness  of  the  home-country  standard.  Hence,  the 
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imprecision of the home-country standard considerably lowers ex ante predictability 
increasing informational costs, drafting costs, and enforcement costs. The argument 
that  a  universalist  system  would  be  more  predictable  ex  ante  to  lenders  than  a 
territorialist  system  therefore  seems  to  fail.  The  extent  to  which  either  one  of  the 
systems would be more ex ante predictable to creditors depends to a large extent on 
the facts of each case. For instance, if a debtor only has assets in two states whereas 
the home-country standard refers to four states, territorialism is more predictable and 
vice versa. 
Another factor that affects ex ante predictability is the possibility universalism and 
territorialism offer a debtor to forum shop. Because bankruptcy is a typical endgame 
the chance that a debtor will strategically use the opportunities to forum shop to the 
detriment of his creditors or other third parties is higher in bankruptcy than outside of 
bankruptcy.
18 Universalists contend that basing jurisdiction on the mere existence of 
assets  would  increase  the  possibilities  for  forum  shopping  because  debtors  can 
strategically shift assets from one jurisdiction to another on the eve of bankruptcy.
19 
Universalism, on the other hand, would prevent such manipulative behaviour, as it 
would be very difficult for companies to change their principal place of business in the 
period  preceding  bankruptcy.  Universalists  are  therefore  opposed  to  a  rule  that 
unequivocally vests jurisdiction with the courts of the country in which the debtor is 
incorporated  as  such  a  bright-line  rule  would  facilitate  eve-of-bankruptcy  re-
incorporations. However, this argument denies the fact that the vagueness of the home-
country standard opens a wide array of forum-shopping possibilities as well, not in the 
least because the further specification of the concept is left to the courts. For instance, 
the  broadly  formulated  venue  rule  of  the  US  Bankruptcy  Code,  which  vests 
jurisdiction with US bankruptcy courts if the debtor has assets or a place of business in 
the  US,  has  given  rise  to  eve-of-bankruptcy  manipulation  by  corporate  debtors  by 
divesting assets or moving headquarters.
20 Even if the home-country standard limits 
jurisdiction  to  principal  place  of  business,  there  is  enough  room  for  creative 
interpretation and concomitant eve-of-bankruptcy actions by debtors. For instance, if 
courts consider the place of headquarters an important connecting factor, debtors could 
move their headquarters prior to bankruptcy. In sum, it is by no means evident that 
universalism would do a better job than territorialism in preventing eve-of-bankruptcy 
manipulation by debtors. To the contrary, the home-country standard may turn out to 
be such a flexible concept that eve-of-bankruptcy actions may not even be necessary 
as the mere judicial interpretation of the home-country standard enables a transnational 
firm to pick from a menu of possible bankruptcy forums the one of its liking.
21 
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B   Protection of Local Creditors and Local Policies 
 
A typical territorialist objection against universalism is that it sets aside local policies 
on such issues as creditors’ priorities, security rights, statutory priority rights, and tort 
law.
22 The costs of disregarding such local policies would disproportionately fall on 
local  non-adjusting creditors,
23 whereas large international lenders who are able to 
adjust  their  contractual  terms  on  a  debtor-by-debtor  basis  would  benefit  from  the 
system.
24 As opposed to universalism, by applying the priority law of each jurisdiction 
on the assets located in its territory territorialism would give effect to the existing 
expectations  of  local  non-adjusting  creditors,  while  not  affecting  internationally 
oriented creditors as these are typically fully adjusting.
25 
However, the impact of universalism on local creditors and tort victims may be less 
dramatic  than  anticipated  by  the  opponents  of  universalism.  To  start,  most  local 
lenders are likely to be weakly non-adjusting. This means that, even though they may 
not  adjust  their  contracts  on  a  debtor-by-debtor  basis,
26  they  may  still  adjust  by 
charging competitive rates of return on their entire portfolio of loans. Consequently, 
they do not bear the costs of ex ante legal uncertainty. Thus, in a universalist regime 
there would be no need to protect local creditors to the extent that they are either fully 
adjusting or weakly non-adjusting. 
Nevertheless, by causing a part of the lenders to charge competitive interest rates 
universalism leads to  ex ante inefficiencies  in a way that territorialism does not.
27 
Charging both high-risk and low-risk borrowers the same interest rate is suboptimal to 
the extent that it makes high-risk debtors borrow more and overinvest in their activities 
and low-risk debtors borrow less and underinvest in their activities. Universalism may 
thus lead to inefficient investments by firms. In contrast, under a territorial system 
local lenders would only have to take into account the effects of the local laws and 
practices so that theoretically they could ask risk-adjusted rates of return. However, it 
is unrealistic to assume that local creditors would suddenly become fully adjusting 
creditors under a territorial system. Local lenders take into account many factors when 
setting their rates of return, and the applicability of a foreign bankruptcy regime is 
only  one  of  them.  Many  other  factors  unrelated  to  the  system  of  international 
bankruptcy law may have a more direct effect on the level of adjustment by local 
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creditors.
28  If  these  other  factors  are  the  primary  determinants  of  the  variance  in 
returns to local creditors, the impact on their contractual terms of a choice-of-law rule 
referring  to  a  foreign  bankruptcy  regime  may  be  insignificant.  Put  differently,  the 
extent to which lenders are able to ask risk-adjusted rates of return depends in the first 
place on the characteristics of their businesses and the market in which they are active, 
and not on the question whether they are internationally oriented or local creditors. 
A second group of weakly non-adjusting creditors are trade creditors. To the extent 
that they are unsecured, the choice-of-law regime may have limited effect on their 
recovery in bankruptcy as unsecured creditors generally do not recover anything or 
very  little  on  their  claims.
29  More  importantly,  however,  is  the  effect  of  foreign 
bankruptcy laws on the position of trade creditors that have security interests in the 
debtor’s  property  such  as  retention-of-title  clauses  or  mechanic’s  liens.  Current 
practice is that bankruptcy courts generally recognise the validity of foreign security 
interests, provided that they are validly created under foreign law. Once recognised, 
bankruptcy courts assimilate the foreign security interest to the forum’s priority and 
property regime by assigning it the status of a right most similar to it. However, as a 
result of such assimilation the creditor’s priority ranking vis-à-vis other creditors, as 
well as the scope of his right vis-à-vis the debtor’s property may change. Still, despite 
the fact that foreign trade creditors thus run the risk that their interests do not have the 
same effect under the home country’s laws as they would have under the foreign laws 
concerned, they are not necessarily relegated to the position of unsecured creditors. 
Equating foreign security interests to similar, albeit somewhat different, security rights 
of the home country therefore attenuates to some extent the costs imposed on trade 
creditors by a foreign bankruptcy regime. Yet, the uncertainty related to the scope of 
recognition of foreign security interests undoubtedly imposes costs on trade creditors. 
Similarly, lenders incur costs if their security interests are not fully recognised under 
the rules of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. These costs, however, are incurred under 
both  a  universalist  and  a  territorial  system  so  long  as  security-interest  regimes 
considerably differ and no uniform system of recognition and ranking of these interests 
exists. Moreover, to the extent that lenders and trade creditors adjust their prices to 
such  uncertainty  these  costs  are  borne  by  firms  in  the  form  of  increased  costs  of 
capital. 
With respect to foreign statutory priority rights the situation is somewhat different. 
Because in a universalist system the home country’s forum applies its own priority 
scheme,  it  disregards  foreign  priority  rights  thereby  relegating  creditors  with  such 
rights  to  the  status  of  generally  unsecured  creditors.  In  this  way,  universalism 
interferes with local distributive policies, which are typically translated into statutory 
priority  rights.  However,  under  the  real-world  forms  of  territorialism  or  modified 
universalism bankruptcy courts generally do not recognise foreign statutory priority 
rights either. On the one hand, in a territorial system local bankruptcy courts only 
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the funds, the out-of-court bankruptcy collection system available to the creditor, the likelihood of 
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recognise  local  statutory  priority  rights.  The  extent  to  which  local  creditors  could 
benefit  from  their  statutory  priority  rights  then  depends  on  the  amount  of  assets 
available in the local estate. On the other hand, a universalist system replaces all local 
statutory priority rights by those of the home country. Foreign local rights are then 
negated insofar as the home country’s laws do not grant the same statutory priority 
status to the creditors involved. 
The issue of statutory priority rights is perceived as highly sensitive, as it affects 
differing  national  policies  and  political  beliefs  on  desired  forms  of  redistribution. 
Nevertheless, the question arises of whether such national policies – apart from certain 
exotic statutory priority rights that can be found here and there – do indeed differ in 
any  fundamental  way.  Notably,  most  bankruptcy  regimes  afford  employee  wage 
claims priority over unsecured creditors, albeit the scope of the priority right and the 
exact  priority  ranking  may  differ  from  jurisdiction  to  jurisdiction.  However,  such 
differences may not constitute serious problems if one considers that at the moment of 
filing for bankruptcy wage liabilities are generally low, since most corporate debtors 
will have an interest in paying their employees as long as possible if they want to 
continue their operations. Consequently, corporate debtors’ incentives to forum shop 
ex post may not be strong as the de facto treatment of wage claims may not differ that 
much among jurisdictions. 
Even if the impact of universalism on local priorities may be less far-reaching than 
initially  expected,  territorialists  could  still  point  to  the  way  in  which  universalism 
protects  tort  victims  as  a  source  of  its  relative  ex  ante  and  ex  post  inefficiency. 
However, the choice of bankruptcy regime has no ex ante impact on tort creditors, as 
they typically cannot adjust to the likelihood of recovery in bankruptcy.
30 In addition, 
because in a universalist system the applicable bankruptcy regime is determined ex 
post on the basis of the home-country standard, debtors cannot ex ante opt for a regime 
that  offers  a  low  priority  status  to  tort  claimants.  Thus,  viewed  from  an  ex  ante 
perspective, universalism appears not to affect the position of tort creditors. 
From  an  ex  post  perspective,  however,  the  fear  for  forum  shopping  may  be 
attenuated if one considers that most bankruptcy laws afford tort claimants the status 
of  generally  unsecured  creditors,  and  that  arguably  only  a  small  minority  of 
bankruptcy laws afford a higher or lower priority to tort claimants. Yet, opponents of 
universalism also point to the substantial differences in treatment of tort claimants 
among  countries,  such  as  differences  in  the  amount  of  damages  granted.  Forum 
shopping would then be attractive if the debtor could choose to file for bankruptcy in a 
country that grants lower damage amounts to tort claimants. This, however, assumes 
that the home country’s substantive laws and practices extend to the adjudication of 
tort  claims,  a  point  of  view  that  is  generally  not  defended  by  universalists. 
Nevertheless, a reason for strategic bankruptcy filings may be that some bankruptcy 
regimes offer possibilities to settle both existing and  future tort claims  against the 
debtor.  Thus,  it  could  be  attractive  for  a  debtor  facing  high  tort  liabilities,  its 
shareholders  as  well  as  its  major  commercial  creditors  to  file  for  bankruptcy  in  a 
jurisdiction that allows for such settlements in bankruptcy.
31 
 
                                                 
30 See Guzman, id at 2191-2192. 
31 Notably, under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code a settlement of future tort claims is possible.   10
C   Insolvency of the Transnational Firm and Value Maximisation 
 
Universalism claims that it provides a better solution to the insolvency problems faced 
by transnational firms than territorialism by reducing both the direct and the indirect 
costs of bankruptcy. First, the direct costs associated with corporate bankruptcy are 
likely to be lower as only one court deals with the administration of the bankruptcy 
case and creditors need to file their claims only once. In addition, the judgments and 
orders issued by the home country court are automatically recognised by the other 
jurisdictions  participating  in  the  universalist  system.  In  contrast, under  a  territorial 
system  cross-border  restructuring  efforts  require  ad  hoc  cooperation  among 
bankruptcy courts and professionals on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, up to now 
only the transnational insolvency cases of large firms have enjoyed the benefits of ad 
hoc  negotiated  solutions,  whereas  smaller  firms  that  face  cross-border  insolvency 
problems  may  not  be  able  to  rely  on  such  ad  hoc  negotiated  solutions  due  to  the 
smaller financial stakes and lower professional prestige involved.
32 
Second, by providing a centralized procedure that administers all the assets of the 
separate legal entities universalism would facilitate reorganisation or going-concern 
asset  sales  of  transnational  firms.  Universalism  would  thus  address  the  collective 
action problem more effectively and better align with corporate bankruptcy law’s goal 
of  value  maximisation.
33  Arguably,  territorialism  impedes  the  efficient  bankruptcy 
administration of companies by confining bankruptcy procedures to national borders. 
To the extent that legal entities only have assets within the territory of their jurisdiction 
of incorporation, such limitation would not be a problem.
34 However, legal entities 
tend to have assets abroad as well so that the failure to include all assets of a legal 
entity  within  the  bankrupt  estate  clearly  is  a  disadvantage  of  territorialism.  With 
respect to separate legal entities, the application of the home country’s bankruptcy 
law’s to assets located outside the territory of the home-country jurisdiction thus has 
advantages from a value-maximising perspective. 
However,  when  applied  to  the  insolvency  problems  of  a  group  of  companies 
universalism raises problems of its own. That centralized proceedings with respect to 
companies  belonging  to  the  same  corporate  group  are  not  necessarily  value 
maximising is an issue largely not addressed by proponents of universalism.
35 The 
reason for this is that the theory of universalism does not properly distinguish the 
insolvency  of  a  single  legal  entity  from  the  insolvency  problems  faced  by  a 
transnational corporate group by not specifying whether the home-country standard is 
determined for each member of the group separately, for the entire corporate group as 
a  whole  or,  for  the  financially  distressed  entities  of  the  group.
36  Yet,  it  often 
emphasises the need of reorganisation of corporate groups as a whole. In so doing, the 
theory of universalism implicitly assumes that if large parts of a corporate group are 
confronted with insolvency problems, the application of a single set of insolvency laws 
                                                 
32 See also Bebchuk and Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis’, n 4 above at 776. 
33  See,  eg,  Westbrook,  ‘Theory  and  Pragmatism’,  n  4  above  at  466;  Guzman,  ‘International 
Bankruptcy’, n 4 above at 2012. 
34 cf LoPucki, ‘Cooperation’, n 7 above at 750; Buxbaum, ‘Rethinking’, n 5 above at 70. 
35 See Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism’, n 4 above at 465-466; Guzman, n 4 above at 2203. 
36 See LoPucki, ‘Cooperation’, n 7 above at 717.   11
to the legal entities involved would lead to more efficient outcomes than leaving the 
administration of the legal entities’ assets to local courts, regardless of the question 
whether the creditors of each legal entity would benefit equally from the approach 
chosen by the home-country forum. 
Undoubtedly, there are circumstances under which the application of a single set of 
insolvency  laws  to  the  separate  legal  entities  belonging  to  a  group  is  the  value-
maximising  approach.  The  issue,  thus,  is  not  that  a  universalist  proceeding  would 
never be beneficial for corporate groups, but that universalism implicitly assumes that 
it would always be the better option. In so doing, it denies the variety of ways in which 
assets and activities are organized within corporate groups. In some corporate groups, 
the  centre  of  gravity  lies  with  the  parent  company  while  the  activities  of  its 
subsidiaries  are  fully  integrated  with  those  of  the  parent  company.  In  these 
circumstances,  the  application  of  a  single  set  of  insolvency  laws  may  be  value 
maximising as solving these problems may require a unified approach. Other corporate 
groups,  however,  may  be  organized  in  such  a  way  that  the  separate  legal  entities 
represent independent businesses or groups of assets that might as well be reorganised 
or liquidated on a stand-alone basis so that a unified approach to the separate legal 
entities’ insolvency problems may not be warranted. The desirability of a rule that 
cedes  bankruptcy  jurisdiction  over  subsidiaries  to  the  home  country  of  the  parent 
corporation  is  therefore  by  no  means  evident.  Admittedly,  such  a  rule  could  be 
qualified by providing that a certain level of integration among the group companies is 
required,  so  that  legal  entities  that  have  independent  businesses  are  not  forced  to 
participate in the bankruptcy proceedings of the parent company. Yet, as a definition 
of  the  required  level  of  integration  is  likely  to  be  vague  and  prone  to  creative 
interpretations,  it  may  reach  too  far  and  subject  subsidiaries  to  an  insolvency 
proceeding that does not guarantee the most efficient deployment of their assets. 
 
 
III  Freedom of Choice and Regulatory Competition 
 
Reviewing  the  debate  on  universalism  and  territorialism,  the  case  made  against 
universalism by pointing to the redistributive effects caused by its interference with 
local  policies  can  hardly  be  called  convincing.  Not  only  may  priority  rankings  of 
national bankruptcy laws show more similarities than differences, but also the current 
application of territorialism may in practice not lead to a better protection of local or 
non-adjusting  creditors.  Yet,  two  pressing  problems  remain  unresolved  under  both 
universalism and territorialism. First, the problem of legal uncertainty as to the law 
that  applies  to  a  transnational  firm’s  bankruptcy.  Second,  and  related  to  the  first 
problem,  is  the  failure  of  both  universalism  and  territorialism  to  consider  the 
relationship  between  corporate  bankruptcy  law  and  corporate  governance  by 
disregarding the ex ante governance needs and preferences of firms. Put differently, 
not only the fact that legal uncertainty exists as to the applicable bankruptcy laws 
increases the costs of capital for firms but also the fact that firms cannot align their 
bankruptcy regimes to their ownership structures by making an ex ante bankruptcy 
choice.   12
Because an unequivocal ex ante choice for bankruptcy law might decrease the costs 
of  capital, some  scholars  have  advanced  freedom  of  choice  as  a rival  principle  of 
international corporate bankruptcy law. Advancing freedom of choice as a conflict of 
laws rule is closely related to a normative approach that advances contractualism in 
corporate bankruptcy law. Advocates of the contract approach to corporate bankruptcy 
emphasise the costs associated with mandatory one-size-fits-all bankruptcy regimes 
that  typically  only  correspond  to  the  governance  preferences  and  needs  of  only  a 
subset of firms. In contrast, a default system of bankruptcy rules could lead to more 
efficient bankruptcy arrangements by allowing a corporate debtor and his creditors to 
deviate ex ante from one or more bankruptcy rules if such a deviation would better fit 
the  debtor’s  governance  needs.
37  Similarly,  proponents  of  freedom  of  choice  in 
transnational  corporate  bankruptcy  point  to  the  costs  that  universalism  imposes  on 
firms as a result of its neglect of the interaction between corporate bankruptcy law and 
ownership structures.
38 A freedom-of-choice regime could provide an opportunity for 
corporate  entities  to  opt  out  of  their  national  systems  by  choosing  a  jurisdiction 
providing bankruptcy laws that better correspond to their specific governance needs. 
Moreover, such an ex ante choice increases predictability for creditors by giving them 
unequivocal information on the applicable bankruptcy law in the case of their debtor’s 
bankruptcy  as  well  as  by  blocking  the  possibility  for  debtors  to  counteract  their 
creditors’ expectations by ex post forum shopping or other strategic eve-of-bankruptcy 
actions. Free choice in bankruptcy could thus potentially lower the costs of capital for 
firms. 
Under a free-choice regime independent corporate entities specify in their corporate 
charters the bankruptcy laws that apply in case of their insolvencies.
39 Corporations 
are allowed to select in their corporate charters bankruptcy laws of a different state 
than their state of incorporation. Nonetheless, if a corporation were to fail to make a 
choice in its corporate charter, the default rule could be that the bankruptcy laws of the 
state of incorporation apply. In the case of a corporate group the ex ante choice is 
made  on  an  entity-by-entity  basis.  The  chosen  bankruptcy  laws  govern  the  firm’s 
bankruptcy regardless of the main location of the debtor’s assets or its principal place 
of business. Because bankruptcy courts are best equipped to apply the bankruptcy laws 
of their own jurisdictions, the choice of law should include the choice of forum as 
well.  Like  under  a  universalist  regime  the  administration  of  the  bankruptcy  forum 
extends to all the assets of the legal entity wherever located. Needless to say, for a 
freedom-of-choice regime to work, states have to recognise and enforce bankruptcy 
selection clauses. Free choice thus requires a rather revolutionary move from state-
                                                 
37 See Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’, (1992) 
71 Texas Law Review 51; Alan Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’, 
(1998) 107 Yale Law Journal 1807. 
38 See Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies’, (1997) 19 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 1; Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through 
Private Ordering’, (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2252, 2260-2261; David A. Skeel Jr., ‘Rethinking 
the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’, (1994) 72 Texas Law Review 471, 523; 
cf  Frederick  Tung,  ‘Passports,  Private  Choice,  and  Private  Interests:  Regulatory  Competition  and 
Cooperation  in  Corporate,  Securities,  and  Bankruptcy  Law’,  (2002)  3  Chicago  Journal  of 
International Law 369. 
39 See Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach’, n 38 above at 32-34.   13
mandated  bankruptcy  laws  to  a  choice-of-law  system  that  embraces  freedom  of 
contract in corporate bankruptcy as its main principle. 
Contrary to universalism, the freedom-of-choice approach suggests that firms are 
better decision makers ex ante than firms and courts ex post.
40 Because firms have to 
make their choice of law at incorporation, they cannot strategically choose bankruptcy 
laws in order to realise wealth shifts from creditors to debtors. Because firms need to 
attract funding from lenders in order to make value-enhancing investments, they have 
an  interest  in  opting  for  bankruptcy  regimes  that  offer  high  levels  of  creditor 
protection. Conversely, if debtors choose bankruptcy regimes that offer low levels of 
creditor protection, creditors will penalise these debtors by raising the price of credit. 
Arguably, in this way corporate bankruptcy law could indirectly influence the choice 
of incorporation by affecting the price of credit.
41 Moreover, because firms are bound 
to their ex ante choice, ex post forum shopping no longer is a possibility. A system of 
freedom of choice thus fosters ex ante as well as ex post value-maximising investment 
behaviour by forcing firms to choose bankruptcy laws that lower the costs of capital. 
Clearly, defending freedom of choice in corporate bankruptcy law equals favouring a 
system of regulatory competition. The theory of regulatory competition asserts that 
market forces impel state lawmakers to enact laws that benefit the consumers of the 
‘law as a product’. First, lower-level governments would adapt their regulations better 
to the preferences of local citizens. Second, decentralized lawmaking would increase 
the probability that jurisdictions offer a wider range of regulatory products in order to 
meet a diverse range of preferences. Put differently, the process of regulatory arbitrage 
– that is the choice of citizens for the laws that best suit their preferences – potentially 
forces state lawmakers to satisfy the preferences articulated by the customers of their 
products. Regulatory arbitrage causes regulatory competition among state lawmakers 
if states adapt their legal regimes in order to attract, or not to lose, their constituencies. 
Ideally,  regulatory competition would lead  to an optimal  equilibrium of regulatory 
outcomes and citizen preferences.
42 A freedom-of-choice regime could thus pressure 
state lawmakers to shape their bankruptcy laws in accordance with the governance 
needs of firms that they would like to attract or the firms that are already incorporated 
in their jurisdictions. Moreover, it could arguably entice lawmakers to include more 
than one bankruptcy option in their laws in order to meet the bankruptcy preferences 
of a variety of legal business forms. Firms could then make a choice from a menu of 
options. In this way, a freedom-of-choice regime could pressure state lawmakers to 
better align their bankruptcy policies to their policies on legal business forms. 
In general, advocates of regulatory competition predict that it ensues a ‘race to the 
top’, while opponents contend that it results in a ‘race to the bottom’. On the one hand, 
the race-to-the-top view purports that competitive diversity counteracts the influence 
of dominant interest groups on the lawmaking process by tailoring regulation to local 
preferences. Moreover, it would lead to more efficient regulatory outcomes because 
                                                 
40 See id at 4. 
41 See Skeel, ‘Rethinking the Line’, n 38 above at 523. 
42 For a critical appraisal of the theoretical underpinnings of regulatory competition and its reception 
by law-and-economics see William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, ‘The New Economics of 
Jurisdictional  Competition:  Devolutionary  Federalism  in  a  Second-Best  World’,  (1997)  86 
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the  decentralized  nature  of  the  lawmaking  process  would  decrease  information 
asymmetries between lawmakers and their constituencies and would foster innovation 
by lawmakers by enticing them to amend their laws to changing preferences. On the 
other hand, the race-to-the-bottom view perceives regulatory competition as leading to 
undesirable  legal  outcomes  as  states  forsake  public  welfare  by  focusing  on  the 
preferences of small groups in their constituencies. Moreover, regulatory competition 
would  lead  state  lawmakers  to  ignore  the  impact  of  the  laws  outside  their  own 
jurisdictions. 
With  respect  to  corporate  law,  the  race-to-the-top  view  purports  that  charter 
competition  in  the  United  States  has  led  to  state  corporate  laws  that  increase 
shareholder wealth by benefiting both managers and shareholders.
43 This is countered 
by a race-to-the-bottom argument holding that, because managers ordinarily choose a 
firm’s  state  of  incorporation,  charter  competition  leads  states  to  enact  increasingly 
management-friendly laws at the expense of shareholders.
44 The race-to-the-top view 
rebuts this by pointing out that shareholders will penalise such incorporation choices 
by discounting the share price. Also, under performing firms are targets for out-of-
state corporate raiders. Thus, market forces would automatically halt the race-to-the-
bottom,  as  managers  will  increasingly  choose  jurisdictions  with  high  standards  of 
shareholder protection thereby forcing states to adopt corporate laws that maximise 
shareholder wealth. 
Considering corporate bankruptcy law, the endgame dynamic of corporate failure 
could support a race-to-the-bottom view when state lawmakers would enact manager-
friendly and shareholder-friendly corporate bankruptcy laws. Because managers fear 
the loss of their jobs, shareholders the loss of their investments, and state lawmakers 
the loss of corporations or income for their local bar and court system, their interests 
may align in favouring manager-friendly and shareholder-friendly bankruptcy laws to 
the  detriment  of  creditors’  interests.
45  In  addition,  because  states  want  to  attract 
investments, countries could be enticed to favour bankruptcy laws that attract debtors 
and large lenders to the detriment of weakly and strongly non-adjusting creditors. Yet, 
the  risk  of  the  enactment  of  overly  debtor-protective  bankruptcy  laws  may  be 
overstated to the extent that both adjusting and weakly non-adjusting creditors could 
ex ante price the chance of wealth shifts from creditors to shareholders.
46 Significantly, 
debtors will ex ante choose the bankruptcy regime that lowers their cost of capital so 
that they are not likely to favour bankruptcy regimes that systematically shift wealth 
from creditors to debtors. 
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Fundamentally, bankruptcy selection clauses could enhance ex ante predictability, as 
creditors would only have to investigate the effects of the bankruptcy laws selected in 
the  corporate  charter.  Easy  access  to  the  bankruptcy  selection  clauses  could,  for 
instance,  be  facilitated  by  registering  the  contents  thereof  with  the  trade  register, 
requiring companies to include their selection on their letter paper or in the general 
conditions they use and requiring them to make such a selection public on their web 
sites. Still, knowing which bankruptcy laws a firm has chosen is one thing, knowing 
the  effects  of  such  laws  on  creditors’  rights  is  another.  The  latter  requires  an 
investigation into both the law in the books and the law in action, which may only be 
cost effective for creditors who assess their risks on a debtor-by-debtor basis. 
In  order  for  free  choice  to  put  pressure  on  state  lawmakers  to  innovate  their 
bankruptcy laws in accordance with the preferences of firms and creditors, the choice 
of  bankruptcy  regime  should,  however,  not  be  tied  to  the  choice  of  the  state  of 
incorporation.  If  the  choice  of  bankruptcy  regime  were  to  be  tied  to  the  state  of 
incorporation,  the  pressure  on  lawmakers  to  align  corporate  bankruptcy  laws  and 
general corporate laws might be too weak. Because the bankruptcy regime will only be 
one of the factors firms consider when choosing their state of incorporation, they may 
trade off the inefficiencies in a bankruptcy regime against efficiencies in the corporate 
law regime or other related areas such as corporate taxation. In addition, if bankruptcy 
choice  were  to  be  tied  to  the  state  of  incorporation,  firms  could  strategically  re-
incorporate in another state on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take advantage of 
debtor-protective bankruptcy laws. Consequently, the efficiency gains of an ex ante 
choice would be forgone. 
More  generally,  re-incorporation  should  not  lead  to  an  immediate  change  of 
corporate bankruptcy regime. This brings us to one of the most important weaknesses 
of a bankruptcy selection regime, namely the possibility of strategic eve-of-bankruptcy 
amendments of bankruptcy selection clauses. Future revisions of bankruptcy selection 
clauses in a way reintroduce the same uncertainty as the home-country standard under 
a universalist regime. The chance that such revisions occur affect ex ante predictability 
of  the  applicable  bankruptcy  regime  to  existing  creditors,  thereby  potentially 
increasing  the  costs  of  capital.  Ideally,  revisions  of  bankruptcy  selection  clauses 
should only take place if such changes reflect fundamental changes in the governance 
structures of firms or in the bankruptcy regime initially chosen. To the extent that 
revisions of bankruptcy selection clauses could be limited to these instances, the costs 
thereof for pre-existing creditors might arguably be limited. In addition, lenders might 
deter debtors from choosing less efficient bankruptcy regimes by including penalties in 
the contracts such as an increase in the price of their credit or the termination of their 
credit  extensions.  Thus,  prevention  of  abuse  of  revision  of  bankruptcy  selection 
clauses might require some form of mandatory regulation. 
Another  problem  related  with  bankruptcy  selection  clauses  is  that  they  do  not 
necessarily  guarantee  that  firms  choose  the  more  efficient  bankruptcy  regime. 
Informational costs at the time of incorporation may inhibit firms from choosing the 
bankruptcy regime that best fits their preferences. Consequently, especially smaller, 
and possibly locally oriented, firms might end up choosing the bankruptcy regime of 
their country of incorporation regardless of whether such a regime would be the more   16
efficient regime for these firms. Also, subsidiaries may choose a certain bankruptcy 
regime only because their parent company pressures them to make such a choice. 
 
IV  Some Barriers to Implementing a Universalist or Free-Choice Regime 
 
Even though from the point of view of ex post value maximisation both universalism 
and freedom of choice may be more desirable regimes than territorialism, there are 
important  barriers  to  the  implementation  by  states  of  either  of  these  regimes. 
Assuming that state lawmakers have a tendency to focus on the interests of their own 
constituencies,
47 a part of  the states in the world will resist the implementation of 
universalist or free-choice regimes. Whether or not states will want to take part in 
these regimes thus depends largely on  the alignment between state lawmakers and 
interest groups. 
An important interest group that has influenced the development of the bankruptcy 
laws of various countries is that of bankruptcy professionals.
48 If state lawmakers are 
aligned  with  the  interests  of  local  professionals,  their  willingness  to  accept  a 
universalist or free-choice regime in bankruptcy depends on whether the professionals 
involved expect to be able to export their bankruptcy expertise and practices more 
often than having to import foreign expertise.
49 Specifically, professionals that work in 
jurisdictions housing important financial centres as well as large transnational firms 
may  favour  a  universalist  approach  to  cross-border  corporate  bankruptcy. 
Consequently, the states that house these professionals have an interest in favouring 
universalism as this will increase their professionals’ incomes and prestige. In contrast, 
states where professionals fear that universalism is likely to result in a loss of business 
to professionals in other states may resist a universalist system as such a system is 
likely to lead to the dominance of foreign bankruptcy regimes over the local regimes. 
If professionals who expect to benefit from a universalist or free-choice regime are 
mainly present in only a few states, the chance that a workable universalist regime 
arises is, however, small. 
Furthermore,  universalism  or  freedom  of  choice  could  interfere  with  local 
redistributive  policies  that  typically  are  translated  into  statutory  priority  rights  that 
benefit local creditors. States’ defence of their own priority-ranking schemes often 
results from the preferences of domestic interest groups for the distributive choices 
made  by  the  local  laws.  Because  the  effects  of  a  choice  for  a  foreign  bankruptcy 
regime may be more visible to these local interest groups than the possible ex ante or 
ex post efficiencies of a universalist or free-choice regime, governments are inclined to 
prefer  their  own  regimes  in  order  to  receive  national  support  for  their  policies.
50 
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Viewed  from  the  perspective  of  creditors  who  have  a  preference  for  their  local 
insolvency  laws,  a  free-choice  regime  could  result  in  a  race  to  the  bottom.  By 
counteracting  redistributive  policies  at  the  local  level,  it  would  arguably  lead  to  a 
lower  level  of  government-mandated  wealth  redistribution  than  the  citizens  of  the 
states affected might prefer. As a consequence, states may prefer weakened forms of 
universalism that provide territorial carve-outs to the benefit of local interests. 
More generally, the claim may hold that the more similar the outcome of bankruptcy 
laws on such issues as security interests, priority rights, or labour contracts, the smaller 
the immediate cost of universalism or free choice at the local level. Universalism and 
free choice would thus require states to agree on a uniform system of security interests, 
priority rights, and the treatment of labour contracts in bankruptcy. In essence, this 
means  that  state  laws  should  considerably  converge  on  matters  that  are  typically 
regulated outside of bankruptcy law.
51 A preliminary requirement for a universalist or 
freedom of choice regime would thus be that states agree on the demarcation of issues 
that are true bankruptcy matters and issues that should ideally fall outside the scope of 
bankruptcy  regulation.  In  the  main,  issues  that  are  typically  regulated  outside  of 
bankruptcy concern such matters as the validity and recognition of security interests, 
statutory  priority  rights,  the  ranking  of  creditors’  rights,  and  labour  law  issues. 
Bankruptcy law, on the other hand, should primarily deal with the collective action 
problem that is reflected in rules on the scope and effect of stay provisions and rules 
on avoiding powers, as well as with the question who controls the bankruptcy estate 
and the question whether deviation in bankruptcy from the priority-ranking outside of 
bankruptcy should be allowed. However, the demarcation of bankruptcy issues already 
poses considerable problems at the level of national bankruptcy laws. Undoubtedly, in 
many insolvency regimes there are instances where bankruptcy law overrides issues 
that are in principle regulated outside of bankruptcy, thereby denying entitlements or 
obligations  that  exist  outside  of  bankruptcy  law  and  vice  versa.  Moreover, 
universalism blurs the proper identification  of  issues that fall outside the scope of 
bankruptcy law even more, by not clearly identifying the matters that are governed by 
home-country  bankruptcy  law  and  those  that  are  governed  by  the  laws  of  other 
countries. 
 
V  The EC Regulation and Corporate Bankruptcy 
 
The EC Regulation on insolvency proceedings offers a salient example of a weakened 
form of universalism that provides territorial carve-outs to the benefit of local interests 
and policies. The EC Regulation has a hybrid character, consisting of both universalist 
and territorialist elements. Its main universalist characteristic is the application of a 
broad home-country standard, which provides that universal main proceedings can be 
opened in the Member State where the debtor has its ‘centre of main interests.’
52 The 
main  proceedings  are  governed  by  the  home-country  law
53  and  encompass  all  the 
                                                 
51 See, eg, Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism’, n 4 above at 468-469. 
52 See Art 3(1), Reg 1346/00. 
53 See Recital (12) and Art 4(1), (2), Reg 1346/00. The lex concursus determines, among others, the 
conditions for the opening of the proceedings, the assets which form part of the estate, the powers of 
the debtor and the liquidator, the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by   18
debtor’s assets, also those located in other Member States. If two or more Member 
States claim competence to open main insolvency proceedings, Member States have to 
recognise the  decision of the court that  first opened the  main proceedings without 
having the power to scrutinise such a decision.
54 
Yet, the EC Regulation makes several important exceptions to the universal scope of 
the main proceedings with a view to the widely differing substantive laws on such 
issues as security interests and priority rights in the Member States and with a view to 
the protection of legitimate expectations and the certainty of transactions in Member 
States other than of the main proceedings.
55 The Member States’ preferences for their 
own territorial bankruptcy regimes and policies have thus considerably restricted the 
scope of the home country’s jurisdiction. 
 
A  The Regulation’s Home-Country Standard: ‘Centre of Main Interests’ 
 
Under the EC Regulation, jurisdiction needs to be determined with respect to each 
legal entity separately, including legal entities that are part of a group of companies.
56 
With respect to companies or legal persons, the EC Regulation provides that the place 
of the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of main interests. On the 
basis of this presumption jurisdiction is thus basically assigned to the Member State in 
which the company is incorporated. Nevertheless, jurisdiction can also be vested with 
the court of another Member State provided that it is established that the company has 
its main centre of interests in that other State.
57 
Despite the fact that the concept of ‘centre of main interests’ is thus an important 
connecting factor, no article in the EC Regulation defines such a concept. Only Recital 
(13) states that the centre of main interests should ‘correspond to the place where the 
debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable by third parties’. The Virgós-Schmit Report remarks that the registered 
office normally corresponds to the debtor’s head office.
58 This might imply that in 
order  to  prove  that  the  company  is  located  in  another  state  than  the  state  of  its 
registered office, one would need to show that the head-office functions are carried out 
in another state. This has important implications for subsidiaries. If, for instance, the 
head-office functions of a subsidiary are carried out at the group headquarters, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
individual  creditors,  the  ranking  of  claims,  and  the  rules  relating  to  the  voidness,  voidability,  or 
unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors. 
54 See Recital (22) and Art 17(1), Reg 1346/00. 
55  See  Recitals  (11)  and  (24),  Reg  1346/00;  Miguel  Virgós  and  Etienne  Schmit,  ‘Report  on  the 
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’, Brussels, 8 July 1996, nos. 12, 13, 21-23 (Virgós-Schmit). 
The  Virgós-Schmit  Report  was  drafted  during  the  negotiations  for  a  Council  Convention  on 
Insolvency Proceedings. Due to the abortion of the Council Convention the Virgós-Schmit Report 
never became official. However, because of the similarity of substance between the Convention and 
the EC Regulation, the Virgós-Schmit Report is considered an important source for the interpretation 
of the EC Regulation. 
56 See Virgós-Schmit, id no. 76. 
57 See Art 3(1), Reg 1346/00; Virgós-Schmit, ‘Report’, n 55 above no. 75. 
58 See Virgós-Schmit, id.   19
court of the Member State where the group headquarters are located could open the 
main insolvency proceedings with respect to the subsidiary.
59 
There is, however, no reason to assume that the further specification of the concept 
of  centre  of  main  interests  would  be  restricted  to  the  location  of  the  head  office 
functions. Because the Regulation provides little to no help in delineating the home 
country  standard,  there  is  ample  discretion  for  creative  judicial  interpretation. 
Moreover,  courts  could  ‘administratively  consolidate’  the  bankruptcy  of  group 
companies if there are facts that support the view that group companies in different 
countries  all  have  the  same  centre  of  main  interests.  Hence,  the  vagueness  of  the 
concept could enable corporate groups to file bankruptcy of both parent company and 
subsidiaries with the same bankruptcy court. Moreover, corporations not incorporated 
or  registered  in  one  of  the  Member  States  could  still  fall  within  the  scope  of  the 
Regulation provided that they have their centre of main interests in the Community. 
This would allow foreign corporations to file for bankruptcy in one of the Members 
States.  Similarly,  the  use  of  such  a  fact  driven  standard  increases  the  scope  of 
jurisdiction of many national bankruptcy courts of which the national laws until now 
provided  that  they  could  only  assert  jurisdiction  if  the  debtor  was  incorporated  or 
registered  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  their  jurisdictions.  These  courts  now  can 
expand their jurisdiction to corporations that have their centre of main interests within 
their jurisdictions albeit not being incorporated or registered there.
60 
Recent case law, notably of English courts, already demonstrates that the concept of 
‘centre of main interests’ can be used in the aforementioned way. With respect to the 
Delaware-based corporation BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc., the English High 
Court  held  that  it  had  jurisdiction  to  grant  an  administration  order  because  the 
corporation had its centre of main interests in England.
61 Because BRAC Rent-A-Car 
was a non-EC corporation, the judge not only had to establish whether the corporation 
had its centre of main interests in England but also if the EC Regulation allows a court 
                                                 
59  See  Gabriel  Moss  QC  and  Tom  Smith,  ‘Commentary  on  Council  Regulation  1346/2000  on 
Insolvency Proceedings’, in Gabriel Moss QC, Ian F. Fletcher LLD and Stuart Isaacs QC (eds), The 
EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and Annotated Guide (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) p 169 comment 8.39. 
60  In  England  this  led  to  amendments  to  the  Insolvency  Act  1986  that  broadened  the  scope  of 
administration orders and company voluntary arrangements in general. Section 8(1) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 – which provision empowered the court to make an administration order in relation to a 
‘company’ – was amended by providing that reference to a company in this section includes reference 
to a company in relation to which an administration order may be made by virtue of Article 3 of the 
EC Regulation. Before this amendment it was uncertain whether administration orders could be made 
in relation to companies not registered under the Companies Act 1985. However, because Article 3(1) 
of the EC Regulation refers to ‘company or legal person’, administration orders can now also be made 
in relation to English companies that have legal personality but are not registered under the Companies 
Act. Likewise, the class of entities that can enter company voluntary arrangements has been broadened 
to unregistered companies as well; see Section 1(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. For an application of 
the  broadened  domestic  scope  of  administration  orders  and  company  voluntary  arrangements  in 
relation  to  an  association  of  members  established  by  Royal  Charter  see,  Re  Salvage  Association, 
[2003] EWHC 1028 (Ch), [2003] 2 BCLC 333. 
61 Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc. [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128, [2003] 1 WLR 1421. At the time 
of its request, BRAC Rent-A-Car already was in Chapter 11 administration. Because the automatic 
stay of Chapter 11 has no direct effect in England, an administration order was requested in England, 
see Re BRAC at 6.   20
to assert jurisdiction with respect to companies incorporated outside the Community. 
As to the latter issue, the High Court held that the EC Regulation only defines the 
scope of its application in terms of the location of the centre of main interests without 
limiting jurisdiction to debtors incorporated in the Community.
62 In addition, the Court 
referred to one of the purposes of the Regulation, namely that of avoiding incentives 
for the parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to 
another in order to obtain a more favourable legal position. This purpose would be 
counteracted  if  companies  having  their  principal  place  of  business  within  the 
Community  were  able  to  incorporate  outside  the  EC.
63  On  the  basis  of  these 
arguments, the Court held that it was in a position to assume jurisdiction with respect 
to the Delaware-based corporation.
64 
As  to  the  question  whether  the  corporation  had  its  centre  of  main  interests  in 
England, the Court established that a literal reading of the EC Regulation leads to the 
conclusion that the debtor’s centre of main interests is the only relevant test to be 
applied.
65 The corporation’s centre of main interests was considered to be in England, 
because it had never traded in the US, its operations were conducted almost entirely in 
the UK, it had subsidiaries in many Western European countries, its trading activities 
were carried out by means of contracts with its subsidiaries and franchisees that were 
all  governed  by  English  law,  it  had  for  a  long  time  been  registered  under  the 
Companies Act as an overseas company, all its employees worked in England, and 
their employment contracts were governed by English law.
66 In sum, the interpretation 
of the concept ‘centre of main interests’ allows English courts to extend administration 
orders to companies that are incorporated outside England, notably those incorporated 
in the United States and other European countries.
67 Similarly, other jurisdictions that 
until  now  could  only  order  bankruptcy  proceedings  with  respect  to  companies 
incorporated or registered within their jurisdictions can do the same. 
The  Daisytek-Isa  Limited  case  provides  another  example  of  the  extension  of 
administration orders to non-UK companies. In this case, administration orders were 
granted against the English parent company Daisytek-Isa Limited, ten of its English 
subsidiaries, three German subsidiaries and one French subsidiary based on the ground 
that these subsidiaries had their centres of main interests with the Bradford head office 
of ISA International Plc, a direct subsidiary of the parent company performing the 
function of head office for the group.
68 ISA International negotiated supply contracts 
                                                 
62 See id at 24-25. 
63 See id at 27; Recitals (3) and (4), Reg 1346/00. 
64  It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  though,  that  the  application  of  the  EC  Regulation  to  a  company 
incorporated under the laws of a jurisdiction that is not subject to the EC Regulation raises conflict of 
laws issues in that the insolvency proceedings as well as the orders and judgments rendered by the 
court  involved  may  not  be  recognised  and  enforceable  outside  the  territories  covered  by  the  EC 
Regulation. 
65 See Re Brac-Rent-A-Car, n 61 above at 29-31. 
66 See id at 4-5. 
67  Prior  to  the  EC  Regulation,  administration  orders  could  only  be  extended  to  UK  incorporated 
companies  and  to  companies  incorporated  in  several  designated  countries,  which  essentially  were 
Commonwealth countries. See § 426 Insolvency Act 1986. 
68 See Re Daisytek-ISA Limited, [2003] WL 21353254 (Ch) [claim nos. 861-876] (available through 
Westlaw). After the French subsidiary ISA Daisytek SAS had already been put in administration, the 
Pointoise Commercial Court ordered second main proceedings in France with respect to the same   21
with and gave guarantees to major suppliers, including guarantees for the amounts due 
to  creditors  by  ISA  Daisytek  SAS,  the  French  subsidiary,  and  PAR  Beteiligungs 
GmbH, the German parent company of two German subsidiaries. The supply contracts 
negotiated by ISA International provided for goods to be sold directly to the trading 
subsidiaries including the German and French ones. The High Court considered that 
the German group companies had their centres of main interests with the Bradford 
head office, even though their registered offices were in Germany and their businesses 
were  conducted  from  premises  in  German  cities.
69  The  Court  considered  that  the 
majority  of  the  administration  of  the  German  companies  was  conducted  from  the 
Bradford office of ISA International because the finance function was operated from 
Bradford; the German companies required the approval of ISA International to buy 
anything in excess of 5000 Euros; all senior employees of the German companies were 
recruited  in  consultation  with  ISA  International;  all  information  technology  and 
support  was  run  from  Bradford;  all  contracts  with  pan-European  customers  were 
negotiated and entered into by ISA International, which contracts amounted to 15% of 
the sales of the German companies; 70 percent of the purchases were negotiated and 
dealt with from Bradford; all corporate identity and branding was run from Bradford; 
and the German companies were required to carry out their business in accordance 
with a management strategy plan drawn up by the CEO of Daisytek-ISA Limited.
70 
Furthermore, the High Court held that the ‘identification of the debtor’s main interests 
required the court to consider both the scale of the interests administered at a particular 
place and their importance and then consider the scale and importance of its interests 
administered  at  any  other  place  which  may  be  regarded  as  its  centre  of  main 
interests.’
71  In  addition,  it  held  that  the  debtor’s  centre  of  main  interests  must  be 
ascertainable by third parties as indicated by Recital (13) of the EC Regulation.
72 In the view 
of the High Court, the most important third parties were the creditors, who in the case 
of a trading company are likely to be its financers and suppliers. The Court added that 
it appeared that a large majority of potential creditors by value knew that Bradford is 
where  many  important  functions  of  the  German  companies  are  carried  out.
73  The 
French  subsidiary  related  to  the  English  Bradford  offices  in  the  same  way  as  the 
German subsidiaries did save that the French subsidiary relied on financial support 
from ISA International and the CEO spent 40% of its time on the management of the 
French subsidiary.
74 
                                                                                                                                                       
company. The English administrators lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of Versailles, which 
court set aside the French bankruptcy order as issuing second main proceedings is clearly in violation 
of the EC Regulation. See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SAS, [2004] I.L.Pr. 6. 
69 See Re Daisytek-ISA, id at 13. 
70 Id at 13.1-13.8. 
71 Id at 14. 
72 Id at 15. 
73 Id at 16. 
74 Id at 17. Another recent case dealt with by English courts is Crisscross; see John Wilcock, ‘How 
Europe Became the Capital of Forum Shopping (and How London Hopes to Become the Delaware of 
Europe)’, (Third Quarter 2003) INSOL World, at 9 (available at www.insol.org); for the reference to a 
case in which an Italian court held that a Dutch subsidiary had its centre of main interests in Rome, see 
R.J. van Galen, ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies’, paper presented at 
INSOL Europe Annual Congress, Cork, Ireland, October 16-13, 2003 (on file with the author).   22
Although the EC Regulation does not explicitly deal with bankruptcy of groups of 
companies, the English cases show that the ex post judicial interpretation of the home -
country standard opens the door to forum shopping. Ex ante predictability to creditors 
– which is in line with the general purpose of the EC Regulation of fostering the 
proper functioning of the internal market – is, however, not served by such imprecise 
standards. In this, the inclusion of ‘ascertainability by third parties’ in the  general 
description of the home-country standard in Recital (13) is the more puzzling. Not 
only is ‘ascertainability by third parties’ a fuzzy indicator, but also its qualities as 
proxy for predicting the applicable law are at the very least doubtful. Although it may 
follow from certain facts that the centre of gravity of a business is located in a certain 
jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that it would therefore be predictable to 
creditors ex ante – that is at the time they enter into their contracts with the debtor – 
that their debtor’s insolvency is to be governed by that jurisdiction’s insolvency laws. 
Yet, it is this ascertainability that has played a pivotal role in the English decisions. 
The point here is not whether in these specific cases bringing the companies within 
one  forum would  have been a good or bad thing
75, but more  generally whether it 
follows from the fact that a business’s centre of gravity is ascertainable by third parties 
that it is predictable ex ante to these third parties that the home-country law is the law 
of the centre of gravity’s location. As such, in internationally oriented companies, and 
in companies belonging to international groups of companies, the choice of a foreign 
law  to  govern  contracts  is  not  unusual,  nor  is  the  involvement  of  employees  of  a 
foreign  group  company  in  the  drafting,  signing,  and  closing  of  contracts.  This, 
however, does not immediately enable creditors to predict ex ante the home-country 
law. In other words, the fact that the centre of gravity of a business is ascertainable to 
third parties does not necessarily say much about the ex ante expectations of these 
third parties as to the laws that apply if the debtor becomes insolvent. Moreover, the ex 
ante  expectations  may  differ  among  creditors  introducing  the  risk  that  the 
ascertainability to only a subset of creditors constitutes a sufficient proof for a debtor’s 
centre of main interests.
76 
In addition, the centre of main interests is a highly manipulative concept, especially 
by debtors. The interpretation is flexible as the EC Regulation does not indicate which 
facts courts should at least take into account, let alone that there are guidelines as to 
the weighing of different facts as indicators for a debtor’s centre of main interests. As 
such, a court could decide to open main proceedings on the basis of an arbitrary set of 
                                                 
75 For instance, in the Daisytek case the UK administration ended with a full recovery for some 85% of 
the creditors in the UK and 100% of the creditors in Norway, Sweden and Northern Ireland, and 1200 
jobs  were  save;  see  Edward  Klempka,  ‘The  Centre  of  Main  Interests  and  the  Administration  of 
Daisytek’, (2004) International Corporate Rescue (Volume1, Issue 1) at 28. 
76  Another  English  decision  demonstrates  that  ‘ascertainability  to  third  parties’  is  indeed  a  fuzzy 
indicator and can easily lead to confusion if it comes to deciding to whom the debtor’s ‘centre of main 
interests’ was actually ascertainable. Although this case involved an individual debtor, the concept of 
centre of main interests and Recital (13) apply here as well. In this case, the debtor’s centre of main 
interests was held to be in Switzerland, so that the EC Regulation did not apply. However, excerpts of 
the court hearing contained in the judgment do not seem to support the view that it was ascertainable 
to  third  parties  –  and  it  apparently  had  not  been  ascertainable  to  the  creditor  petitioning  for  the 
bankruptcy order – that Switzerland had to be regarded as the debtor’s centre of main interests. See 
Geveran Trading Co. Ltd. v. Skjevesland, [2003] BPIR 73.   23
facts or could even let one single fact determine its decision. Importantly, if great 
value is attached to where a company’s main strategic decisions are taken, many group 
companies could be brought within the reach of the bankruptcy courts of the Member 
State where the parent company has its headquarters, regardless of the question where 
the company’s employees are located, with whom its main creditors have contracted, 
where its daily operations are conducted, or what expectations the creditors had with 
respect  to  the  applicable  insolvency  laws  at  the  moment  they  contracted  with  the 
debtor.
77 The possibility for debtors and their counsel to tailor the facts to their own 
advantage is even greater if one considers that generally few or no possibilities exist 
for interested  parties to object  to  such interpretation. Arguably, only  few creditors 
know of the moment that the debtor files for bankruptcy, and the creditors that are 
informed thereof are likely to be such creditors as main bank financers, who support 
the filing.
78 Moreover, the decision to open main proceedings has to be challenged 
before the opening court itself, which may create an extra barrier to foreign creditors. 
 
B  The Territorial Elements of the EC Regulation 
 
Even though the EC Regulation has considerably extended the jurisdictional scope of 
national  bankruptcy  courts  in  the  Community,  the  scope  of  the  home-country’s 
jurisdiction is limited in two important ways in order to protect local interests and 
guarantee legal certainty. First, the EC Regulation makes several important territorial 
carve-outs for the protection of local assets and creditors. Second, it allows national 
secondary proceedings covering only the assets situated in the State of opening of such 
proceedings.
79 
First, a territorial carve-out is made with respect to security interests.
80 Because of 
their importance for the granting of credit, the EC Regulation provides that security 
interests  in  assets  situated  outside  the  territory  of  the  home-country  State  are  not 
affected by the main proceedings.
81 In essence, this means that secured creditors can 
still enforce their claims against the assets located outside the home-country’s territory 
without being affected by provisions of the main proceedings that restrict creditors’ 
                                                 
77 See Ken Baird and Richard Tett, ‘Arms of U.K. Administration Embrace U.S. Companies’, (2003) 
22 May American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 14, 61-62 (mentioning that in the unreported Enron 
Directo Sociedad Limitada case the English court accepted that the centre of main interests of the 
Spanish company Enron Directo was in England, because some of its strategic decisions were made at 
Enron’s European headquarters in London and certain board meetings were held in London as well, 
but  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  company  had  Spanish  employees  and  its  day-to-day  business 
operations took place in Spain). Enron Power Operations Limited, the European holding company of 
the Enron Group, petitioned as a creditor for the administration order of Enron Directo. The skeleton 
argument of the petitioner is available at www.iiiglobal.org. 
78  cf  Baird  and  Tett,  id  (noting  that  the  hearing  to  open  administration  proceedings  is  generally 
unopposed and that on a debtor’s administration petition the company only needs to notify creditors 
that hold floating charges). 
79 Recital (11), Reg 1346/00. 
80  Other  territorial  carve-outs  regard  the  right  to  set-off,  reservation  of  title,  contracts  relating  to 
immoveable property, payment systems and financial markets, the treatment of employment contracts, 
rights subject to registration, and detrimental acts, see Art 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 10, and 13, Reg 1346/00. 
81 See also Virgós-Schmit, ‘Report’, n 55 above no. 97.   24
enforcement rights.
82 The fact that the scope of the stay provisions of the national 
bankruptcy  laws  considerably  diverges  is  the  likely  reason  for  excluding  the 
enforcement  of  security  interests  from  the  universal  effect  of  the  main  insolvency 
proceedings. Moreover, under the national laws of Member States secured creditors’ 
enforcement rights in bankruptcy may be perceived as an important part of the content 
of their rights, regardless of the fact that a stay of enforcement rights arguably is a 
typical bankruptcy issue.
83 In practice this means that if the main proceedings stay 
secured creditors’ enforcement rights, they will only do so with respect to encumbered 
assets  situated  within  the  territory  of  the  State  of  the  main  proceedings.
84  If 
encumbered assets are located in other Member States the insolvency proceedings of 
which  stay  the  enforcement  rights  of  secured  creditors,  the  liquidator  in  the  main 
proceedings can open secondary proceedings in these Member States only if the debtor 
has  an  establishment  in  such  Member  States.  However,  in  all  other  situations  the 
liquidator in the main proceedings cannot reach encumbered property located outside 
the  territory  of  the  home  country.  Clearly,  the  risk  that  the  deployment  of  certain 
encumbered assets may fall outside the scope of the main proceedings could cause 
problems in the framework of restructuring efforts of transnational businesses. 
Second, territorial  proceedings can be opened in the Member State in which the 
debtor  has  an  establishment.  The  effects  of  these  proceedings  are  restricted  to  the 
assets located in that Member State.
85 Once main insolvency proceedings are opened, 
these  territorial  proceedings  become  secondary  proceedings.
86  The  EC  Regulation 
defines an establishment as any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-
transitory economic activity with human means and goods.
87 The broad definition has 
been  the  result  of  a  compromise  with  Member  States  that  wished  to  have  the 
possibility  of  basing  territorial  proceedings  on  the  mere  presence  of  assets  in  a 
Member State. The final consensus reached leaves out the presence of assets as a basis 
for  starting  a  territorial  proceeding,  but  nevertheless  offers  a  basis  for  a  broad 
interpretation of the concept of establishment.
88 The reference to ‘human means and 
goods’  implies that a minimum level  of organization and a certain stability of the 
economic  activities  are  required.
89  However,  given  the  fact  that  legal  entities  are 
                                                 
82  Art  5(1),  (2)  Reg  1346/00.  The  validity  and  the  contents  of  security  interests  (rights  in  rem), 
however, continue to be determined by the lex situs, see Recital (25), Reg 1346/00. 
83  For  instance,  in  the  Netherlands  mortgage  holders  (hypotheekhouders)  and  pledge  holders 
(pandhouders) are considered to ‘separate themselves’ from the bankruptcy estate in that they can 
foreclose their collateral ‘as if there were no bankruptcy proceeding’ (they do have to turnover a 
surplus to the bankruptcy estate, but they do not have to cooperate with the court-appointed official in 
foreclosing  their  collateral).  This  ‘separatism’  is  traditionally  presented  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
content of a right of mortgage (hypotheekrecht) and a right of pledge (pandrecht). 
84 The local assets, however, remain part of the estate of the main proceedings so that any surplus 
remaining after the realisation of the rights in rem has to be turned over to the liquidator in the main 
proceedings. See also Virgós-Schmit, ‘Report’, n 55 above no. 99. 
85 Art 27, Reg 1346/00. 
86 Art 3(2), (3), Reg 1346/00. The liquidator in the main proceedings can request the opening of 
secondary insolvency proceedings; see Art 29(a), Reg 1346/00. 
87 Art 2(h), Reg 1346/00. 
88 See Virgós-Schmit, ‘Report’, n 55 above no. 70 (noting that the mere presence of assets, eg the 
existence of a bank account, is not sufficient for local territorial proceedings to be opened). 
89 See Virgós-Schmit, ‘Report’, n 55 above no 71.   25
assessed  separately  under  the  Regulation,  a  subsidiary  would  not  constitute  an 
establishment.
90  
The protection of local interests is one of the reasons for providing the possibility of 
secondary  proceedings.
91  More  specifically,  secondary  proceedings  can  be  used  to 
protect creditors holding local statutory priority rights.
92 For example, if creditors of an 
establishment located in another Member State have statutory priority rights that do 
not  have  equivalents  under  the  home-country  law,  they  can  protect  their  priority 
position by filing for a secondary bankruptcy proceeding. 
 
C  The Development of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in the European Union 
 
As  the  example  of  the  EC  Regulation  demonstrates, substantial  differences  among 
Member States on such issues as security interests and statutory priority rights have 
led to the implementation of a weakened form of universalism. This posits the question 
whether the approach chosen by the EC Regulation is sufficient from the perspective 
of the ‘proper functioning of the internal market’, or whether such proper functioning 
would instead require that the Member States agree on the approximation of their laws 
in  such  fields  as  property  law,  statutory  priority  rights,  and  the  treatment  of 
employment contracts. Put differently, as long as Member States consider their local 
policies to diverge substantially any attempt to regulate cross-border insolvencies may 
turn out to be futile. 
At the same time, recent case law has demonstrated that the vague home-country 
standard may strengthen the dominant position of American and English professionals 
in the field of large cross-border insolvencies. Given the fact that many US groups 
base their European headquarters in London, the English courts and professionals may 
as  well  consolidate  their  dominance  in  this  field.  Consequently,  they  have  the 
opportunity  to  export  their  expertise  and  practices.  Yet,  their  dominance  does  not 
automatically lead to more efficient bankruptcy laws. As such, the influence of these 
professionals on lawmakers is not based on their desire to make bankruptcy laws more 
efficient, but in the first place on their wish to increase their own rents. 
In general, the issue of cross-border insolvencies begs the question at which level of 
lawmaking within a federal system bankruptcy should be regulated and by means of 
what  regulatory  process.  As  indicated,  the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  capital  for 
transnational firms requires an enhanced level of legal certainty for investors as well as 
lawmakers that are responsive to the governance needs and preferences of different 
kinds of firms. To be sure, it should not be taken as a given that within a federal 
system corporate bankruptcy law should be regulated at the federal level. For instance, 
the fact that the United States has federal bankruptcy laws may have been more the 
result of a political and historical process, than of a deliberate process of lawmaking 
aiming at the creation of efficient bankruptcy laws. Largely, Wall Street lawyers and 
investment bankers have influenced the development of the US federal reorganisation 
laws. This has led to a complex reorganisation procedure that may on the one hand be 
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a flexible procedure for large publicly held firms, but on the other hand is criticised for 
its lack of reorganisation provisions apt for smaller and medium sized businesses.
93 
The theory of regulatory competition suggests that free choice for firms would foster 
the development of more efficient bankruptcy laws. Even if regulatory competition in 
corporate bankruptcy law may not be foreseeable in the near future, discussing the 
possibility of regulatory competition could redirect the focus of the lawmaking process 
within the European Union. Fundamentally, the proper functioning of a free-choice 
regime in corporate bankruptcy requires national bankruptcy laws to focus on their 
main functions, namely that of providing regimes that foster optimal asset deployment 
decisions. This means that corporate  bankruptcy laws should mainly deal with the 
issue of governance of the insolvent corporation. It should thus regulate such issues as 
who  controls  (the  debtor  or  a  court-appointed  official),  the  powers  of  the  person 
controlling the administration of the estate, the scope of the stay provisions, and the 
question  whether  the  debtor  and  its  creditors  (including  shareholders)  may  deviate 
from  the  non-bankruptcy  priority  scheme.
94  In  this  way,  firms  could  choose  a 
bankruptcy regime that fits their ownership structure, which in turn could potentially 
lead to pressure on state lawmakers to provide more flexible bankruptcy laws. 
A regime of free choice in corporate bankruptcy thus requires a proper demarcation 
of bankruptcy law issues. Extending the scope of corporate bankruptcy law beyond 
issues  related  to  the  governance  of  the  insolvent  corporation  blurs  the  distinction 
between corporate bankruptcy law and other areas of the law. If, as a result, the choice 
of  firms  for  corporate  bankruptcy  regimes  is  no  longer  solely  guided  by  the 
governance characteristics of a given bankruptcy regime, the process of convergence 
to more efficient bankruptcy laws may be hampered. 
This  raises  the  question  whether  regulatory  competition  in  the  field  of  corporate 
bankruptcy law would be an option for the development of bankruptcy laws within the 
EU. As such, this option is still open. Yet, a necessary condition in order for such a 
regime of free choice to work is a high degree of convergence on such issues as cross-
border  tax  issues,  a  uniform  system  for  the  recognition  and  ranking  of  security 
interests as well as the ranking and recognition of statutory priority rights and liens.
95 
Another condition to be met is universal access to the laws of competing jurisdictions. 
To be sure, many of these conditions are not met in the EU.
96 Yet, recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice has opened the door for state competition in corporate 
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law  by  giving  more  room  to  the  incorporation  doctrine.
97  Arguably,  a  move  to 
regulatory  competition  in  corporate  law  could  make  the  case  for  free  choice  in 
corporate bankruptcy law more compelling. Whether free choice would also lead to 
competition  among  jurisdictions  remains  to  be  seen.  Even  if  convergence  on  such 
issues  as  security  interests  and  priority  rights  could  be  achieved,  differences  in 
language and legal culture among Member States may still constitute an important 
barrier to free choice. Therefore, jurisdictions that are more innovative and responsive 
to the demands of firms and the laws and practices of which are easier to access could 
stand  a  higher  chance  of  attracting  firms  as  well  as  exporting  their  laws  to  other 
jurisdictions. Notably, the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions would stand to gain from free 
choice.  Other  jurisdictions  may  have  to  adjust  their  laws  in  order  not  to  lose 
businesses, but may not be able to effectively compete with jurisdictions that already 
dominate business law and practice. 
 
VI  Conclusion 
 
Universalism,  territorialism  and  free  choice  all  come  with  their  own  problems. 
Nevertheless, the comparative advantage of a universal approach to the insolvency 
problems of a single legal entity is its potential for ex post value maximisation of the 
firm. Free choice in bankruptcy could combine this advantage with a higher degree of 
ex ante predictability as well as with the possibility of aligning bankruptcy regimes to 
ownership  structures.  However,  neither  universalism  nor  a  free-choice  regime  in 
corporate bankruptcy is likely to be adopted as long as state laws show considerable 
divergence in major areas of commercial law that are essentially regulated outside of 
bankruptcy law. Yet, introducing the concept of free choice to the debate on cross-
border insolvency of firms may redirect the focus of the debate to the question at what 
lawmaking level in a federal system corporate bankruptcy law should be regulated in 
order to guarantee a development toward more efficient bankruptcy laws. With respect 
to  the  European  Union,  this  might  suggest  that,  as  a  next  step  in  its  lawmaking 
initiatives, it should not aim at harmonization of national bankruptcy laws, but instead 
focus  on  the  identification  and  approximation  of  those  national  rules  outside  of 
bankruptcy law that at present negatively affect the proper functioning of the internal 
market. Moreover, leaving the development of bankruptcy laws to the Member States 
enables States to customise their bankruptcy laws to the needs and preferences of local 
firms while not closing the door for state competition in corporate bankruptcy law as 
an alternative means of lawmaking within a federal system. 
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